What is required in a land dispute when one party submits a survey plan

 BOLANTA & ANOR v. TOSIN NOVEL FIRMS LTD (2020) LPELR-52507(CA)

"From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties, that is the 1st appellant, and the respondent both knew the land they were disputing its ownership or title thereto. The fact that different names were given to the parcel of land in dispute by the parties "GBEDUGBEDU OR EKUNKUN" is of no legal significance in the determination of who between the respondent and the 1st appellant has proved a better title to the said land. The conflict in the name(s) of the disputed land can easily be solved bearing in mind the principles of law espoused the case of Akiti vs Oyekunle (2005) All FWLR Pt. 776 P.570 @ 586, wherein, this Court propounded that: "It is apparent that in the instant case, that the land in dispute is known to all the parties even though it is being called by different names or described differently. The law is settled that where the identity of the land in dispute is known to the parties, the fact that different names are given to the land or area where the land is located is called by separate names, is not fatal to the case of the party claiming interest in such land. In EDJEKPO v. OSAI (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 361) 1617, (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1037) 635 at 671 - 672 Paras H - B, the Supreme Court, per ONNOGHEN JSC held: "...it is not strange, in fact it is a common feature in a claim for title to land that parties to the dispute call the land in dispute by different names, and will always identify different landmarks as constituting the boundary features of the land. The Courts have always seen through the contrivances and determine the real issue in controversy between the parties, which is; who is the actual party entitled to be declared the owner." In the instance case and from the finding of the trial Court, the claimant produced both a survey plan and a composite plan identifying the area of the land in dispute and it is trite law that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of facts by a trial judge unless same is shown to be perverse." Furthermore, in paragraphs 10 to 12 of his Statement of Oath, the 1st appellant deposed to these facts as located on pages 171 of the record of appeal, as follows: "10. That I know as a fact that I hired a heavy duty machine to bulldozer a portion of the land sold to me by the 2nd defendant's family. 11. That I know as a fact that the driver of the heavy duty machine reported to me that while he and his staff were bulldozing the land they were challenged by one Elder J.A. Esan to stop work claiming that the land belongs to a company whose name is Tosin Novel Firms Nig. Ltd. 12. That I know as a fact that the land that was bulldozed belongs to me and not to Tosin Novel Firms Nig. Ltd or any one whatsoever." By the foregoing depositions of the 1st appellant, it is not in doubt that he knew the land in dispute was sold to the respondent and also to him. This parcel of land in dispute was well-known to the respondent and the 1st appellant. I am in full agreement with the learned judge of the lower Court when he held as recorded on pages 420 - 421 of the printed record of appeal thus: "I seem to agree with the submission of Toyin Oladipo Esq., that the claimant and defendants are talking about the same piece of land and it does not matter whatsoever name anybody decides to give to or call the land in the event of dispute. I also share his view that there is no paragraph in the 2nd defendant's statements on oath where the location of Gbedugbedu land is given as distinct from the land that the defendants now call or refer to as Ekunkun land. For clarity, paragraph 33 of the 2nd defendant's statement on oath states as follows: 33. That my Family's representatives resident in Afon (the situs of the land in question) knows the length and breath of Ajara Family land located at Ajara Family land. Gbedugbedu Area Afon Asa LGA of Kwara State. It is important to note that while the claimant called the surveyor who survey his land to testify and tendered a survey plan showing the extent and location of its own land at Gbedugbedu Area, the 1st defendant neither called his own surveyor nor tender a survey plan. More importantly, in paragraph 3 of his written Statement on Oath No. 2 which he adopted, Pw.2 who drew the survey plan marked as Exhibit 8 stated categorically that it is the same land at Gbedugbedu Area Afon that the defendants now refer to as Ekunkun land. Like I said earlier the defendant did not call any surveyor or even give evidence of the exact location of the land called Ekunkun; it is therefore my view that Gbedugbedu and Ekunkun land is one and the same and the claimant and defendants are talking about the same piece of land. I hold therefore that the claimant has sufficiently established the identity of the land in dispute as being the same as that of the 1st defendant." Per IBRAHIM SHATA BDLIYA, JCA (Pp 21 - 25 Paras E - F)

What is required for a deponent in an affidavit who derives information from another source?

 "A deponent of an affidavit in any proceeding before a Court of law is a witness in the matter. Section 115 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 enjoins the deponent as a witness, to depose to facts in an affidavit that "either of his own personal knowledge or from information which he believes to be true". It is not enough to set out in the preamble paragraphs of an affidavit for the deponent to restate the facts that he has been authorized either by his principal or employer, and the client to make the affidavit; and that he derived the facts averred in the affidavit in the course of his employment and/or from his personal knowledge and/or information generally. For every assertion in a specific averment the deponent, consistent with Section 115 (1), (3) & (4) of the Evidence Act, must disclose with particulars his source of information and belief.
The counter-affidavit of Charles Jibuaku, Esq., a Legal Practitioner, is replete with obvious hearsay and unverifiable facts.
Paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit, for instance, avers "that private investigation reveals that the Applicant had secretly relinquished his interest in the res in favour of the deponent and/or other unknown persons, which fact is concealed from this Honourable Court but can be ascertained from the tenancy contracts and proof of payment of rent". No tenancy contract or receipt for payment of rent was exhibited. The source of this information on which the weighty allegation is predicated remains a matter for conjecture. The averment, like many others in the counter-affidavit, is reckless, and offensive of the provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act. Paragraph 3 thereof does not state how the deponent of the counter-affidavit comes to the bold assertion "that the deponent of the Applicant's affidavit is a total stranger to this proceedings." The averment does not seek to discharge the burden of proof laid on his shoulders by Sections 131 and 132 of Evidence Act that he who asserts any facts must prove that those facts exist inorder to succeed.
Upon reading the counter-affidavit, one gets the impression that it is tailored to meet an application for stay of execution of a judgment. There is no such prayer in the application. The quixotic counter-affidavit appears to substantially attack a phantom."  Per EKO ,J.S.C in jimoh v. hon. minister federal capital territory & ors (2018) LPELR-46329(SC)  (Pp. 10-12 paras. A-A)